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In economic terms the euro is a success. Now it is time to upgrade the po-
litical importance of the Eurozone. The Europeans would like to play a 
greater leadership role in the global economy. That is precisely the reason 
why they should pave the way for a reform of the International Monetary 
Fund, and pool the representation of their interests in the IMF. It is above 
all up to Germany and France to take the lead. 
Ten years after the introduction of the 
euro Europe has still not managed to make 
full use of its possibilities in the areas of 
global financial and monetary policymak-
ing. The voice of the Europeans is virtually 
inaudible when it comes to the question of 
global exchange rate imbalances (e.g., 
with regard to the Chinese Renminbi), the 
problem of global balance of payments 
inequalities, or governance reform within 
the IMF. The Europeans do not suffer from 
a dearth of opinions and formal represen-
tation, but from their inability to trans-
mute them into political clout.  
 
The most blatant example of this is the 
fact that, despite having a common cur-
rency, the countries of the Eurozone do 
not even speak with one voice in the 
International Monetary Fund. Even in the 
IMF the Eurozone continues to give the 
impression that it is a patchwork quilt of 
15 nation-states. Their influence remains 
fragmented, and is thus of little impor-
tance. However, a reform of the IMF will 
give Europe the opportunity to provide 
leadership in the global economy. 
 
The consolidation of the European votes in 
the IMF would pave the way for a state-of-
the-art governance reform of the IMF. The 
powers of the future, above all China and 
India, could at last be integrated in an ap-
propriate manner and would then be able 
to shoulder certain responsibilities. The 
key to all this is in the hands of the Euro-
peans. An important step in the right di-
rection would be a single voting group for 
the Eurozone in the IMF. What is needed 
is one voice for the euro which people 
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would listen to, a voice which would also 
upgrade the euro in political terms. 
 
I 
Ten Years of the Euro: 
Economic Giant, Political 
Dwarf 
In its first decade the euro, in economic 
terms, has developed into the second 
world reserve currency. In the global 
economy the euro has begun to compete 
on a par with the U.S. dollar. More than a 
third of all international short-term bonds 
is now being issued in euro, which means 
that the euro has almost caught up with 
the dollar, which has a share of 40 per 
cent. Even in the case of longer-term 
bonds the euro has attained a global share 
of almost 30 per cent. A third of all inter-
national bonds means that the market 
share of the euro is 
about six times as 
high as that of the 
Japanese yen. 
 
The economy of the 
Eurozone profits a 
great deal from the 
fact that the euro 
has advanced to be-
come the second 
world reserve cur-
rency. In addition to 
conducting the fi-
nancing of its inter-
national transac-
tions in its own cur-
rency and using it for worldwide invoicing, 
this is above all due to the historically low 
interest rates in the euro area. Since the 
outbreak of the First World War the long-
term interest rates have not been as low as 
they were in the first decade after the in-
troduction of the euro. This reflects the 
stability of its internal value just as much 
as the worldwide trust which investors 
place in the euro.  
 
 
In economic terms the euro has already 
got very close to its main target after ten 
years. In the global economy it has estab-
lished itself as a real competitor of the 
U.S. dollar. The latter’s stranglehold has 
thus been broken. The euro is clearly a gi-
ant in economic terms. But what about the 
political dimension? 
 
The euro was never a project that was ex-
clusively motivated by economic consid-
erations. Exercising political influence in 
the global economy has always been the 
other side of the euro coin. The predomi-
nance of the U.S. dollar began at the end 
of the First World War after the abolition 
of the gold standard and the end of ster-
ling as a global reserve currency. In eco-
nomic terms the new order after the Sec-
ond World War was also a kind of “pax 
Americana.” In the Bretton Woods system 
of fixed exchange rates the U.S. currency 
was the only one which enjoyed the privi-
leges of a reserve currency.  
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank were institutions set 
up after the war to facilitate the reordering 
of the global economy. Their design and 
governance were also dominated by the 
U.S. The collapse of the system of fixed 
exchange rates at the beginning of the 
1970s did nothing to change this. In terms 
of monetary policy Europe remained a 
patchwork, and it had nothing with which 
to counter the predominance of the U.S.  
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dollar. The euro created a series of new po-
litical possibilities, though as yet they 
have not been used.  
 
Even in the IMF – the most important 
global institution of finance and monetary 
policy – the Eurozone has not managed to 
progress beyond a largely non-committal 
ad hoc coordination of its interests. The 
current forms and rules governing this co-
ordination of interests are, to put it mildly, 
opaque. The chairman of the Eurogroup, 
Jean-Claude Juncker, only recently de-
scribed this state of affairs as “absurd.” “It 
makes us seem completely risible, in the 
international arena people think that we 
are clowns.” Even Jean-Claude Trichet, the 
President of the ECB, and Jean-Claude 
Juncker, the chairman of the Eurogroup, 
both of them important actors in the field 
of international finance and monetary pol-
icy, are degraded to the status of periph-
eral figures who seem to be playing guest 
roles. 
 
Has the euro after 10 years already be-
come a giant in economic terms, whilst in 
political terms it is still a dwarf? These 
conclusions seem rather apposite, but the 
Europeans should not treat them as the 
last word on the subject. 
 
II 
The Eurozone in the IMF: a 
Patchwork and not “One 
Voice” 
The current problems of the Eurozone in 
the IMF are easy to describe. Instead of 
speaking with one voice the Europeans, 
even after the introduction of the euro, 
have retained their various national mem-
berships and representatives in the IMF. 
And despite the euro the influence of the 
EU remains distributed among a total of 
27 member states, which participate sin-
gly in the IMF with the weight of their re-
spective national quotas, and administer 
the associated voting rights on a nation-
state basis. 
To use their voting rights in the Executive 
Board, which is in charge of the day-to-day 
running of the IMF, the majority of the 
current 185 member states have joined 
forces in what are known as voting groups. 
These voluntary groupings pool the voting 
rights of their members and can be repre-
sented as a bloc by one member of the Ex-
ecutive Board. Only the five largest IMF 
participants (U.S., Japan, Germany, France 
and the UK), by virtue of the statutes, and  
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China, Russia and Saudi Arabia have their 
own representatives on the Executive 
Board. 
 
Of the 27 EU member states, three have 
seats of their own, whereas the other 24 
countries are spread over a total of seven 
different voting groups. Thus the voice of 
the EU is divided up on the Executive 
Board between a total of ten Executive Di-
rectors. That is not the only problem. On 
top of this is the fact that the voting 
groups of the EU member states are very 
diverse and also comprise numerous non-
EU states: 
 
•  The voting group in which Belgium has 
the chair also represents Belarus, Kazakh-
stan and Turkey on the Executive Board in 
addition to six other EU countries. 
 
•  The Netherlands represents a voting 
group in which, in addition to four other 
EU countries, there are as many as eight 
non-EU countries. 
 
•  In their respective voting groups Spain, 
Ireland and Portugal are in fact the only 
EU member states. 
 
The Eurozone is just as fragmented as the 
EU. In addition to Germany and France, 
each of which has its own seat on the Ex-
ecutive Board, the 13 other countries of 
the Eurozone are spread over a total of six 
different voting groups. Thus nine of the 
24 Executive Directors on the Executive 
Board represent the interests of the Euro-
zone, at least in theory. It hardly needs to 
be said that this cannot lead to a coherent 
perception of the Eurozone as an impor-
tant voice in the concert of the world’s 
currencies. 
“A strategy of ‘less might 
be more.’” 
It is a fact that there is no dearth of either 
suggestions or appeals in Europe and else-
where to do something about this state of 
affairs and to consolidate either the mem-
berships and/or the EU voting rights in 
the IMF.  
It is a sad fact that the EU has not only 
stymied itself in this question, but is hold-
ing up the timely governance reform of the 
whole IMF. This is supposed above all to 
enable the rising emerging economies and 
third-world countries to play an appropri-
ate part in the IMF, and in this way to in-
tegrate them better into the global econ-
omy. 
 
 
III 
Europe hinders IMF  
reforms 
In formal terms Europe is the largest 
power bloc within the IMF. The votes of 
the 27 EU member states currently add up 
to about 32 per cent, which is almost twice 
as much as the U.S. (just about 17 per 
cent). Even the Eurozone on its own with 
its share of almost 23 per cent towers 
above what is currently the largest and 
most influential member country, the U.S. 
 
Nevertheless the real balance of power in 
the IMF turns the formal one upside down. 
The U.S. is the only country to have its 
own veto right in the IMF. In this way it 
has far more influence than the “patch-
work” EU. In the final analysis less could 
thus turn out to be more for the EU and 
the Eurozone if they manage to consolidate 
their national voting rights, and then 
speak and vote with one voice.  
 
In any case, scenarios leading to a globally 
more equitable representation of all coun-
tries in the IMF and one which is more in 
line with the real state of affairs are more 
realistic than pipe dreams of a “European 
superpower.” The rising emerging econo-
mies and third-world countries should get 
a better deal, especially China and India. 
Here Europe could pave the way for genu-
ine IMF governance reform. 
 
The EU should embark on a strategy of 
“less might be more.” By consolidating its 
national voting rights it could increase its 
influence significantly despite having a  
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lower number of votes. At the same time a 
considerable number of votes would be-
come available for distribution to the 
emerging economies and third-world coun-
tries. Thus the EU would become an opin-
ion leader and the moving force of IMF re-
form, which to this day has failed to mate-
rialize on account of unwillingness within 
the EU to overcome national egoism. 
 
Without incurring costs of any kind 
Europe could make a considerable contri-
bution to a more equitable global economic 
order and facilitate the integration of the 
emerging markets and third-world coun-
tries into the structures of the globalized 
world. If such reforms are not imple-
mented, the emerging economies will lose 
interest in those institutions connected 
with globalization which refuse to allow 
them to participate in an appropriate 
manner. The IMF’s dramatic decline would 
continue. The global economy and its insti-
tutions would disintegrate and the impor-
tance of regional power blocs would gain 
ground at the expense of the multilateral 
approach of an integrated global economy. 
The almost complete refusal of emerging 
economies and third-world countries to 
avail themselves of financial help from the 
IMF is a foretaste of this. So are the dis-
cussions about the foundation of an Asian 
monetary fund designed to compete with 
the IMF. 
 
For this reason leading 
U.S. think tanks have 
quite rightly condemned 
the well-nigh total failure 
of the IMF reforms in 
April 2008. They believe 
that only far-reaching re-
forms will make it possi-
ble to renew the leader-
ship role of the IMF as it 
grapples with attempts to 
determine the future 
shape of globalization. 
There was also a great 
deal of criticism of the 
Europeans who, on ac-
count of their inability 
and unwillingness to con-
solidate their own posi-
tion within the IMF, had 
once again made it im-
possible to introduce re-
forms. 
 
It would not be difficult 
for the Europeans to as-
sume a leadership role in 
the global economy. They 
merely need to seize the 
opportunity. Two ap-
proaches suggest them-
selves: 
•  The EU consolidates its 27 current na-
tional memberships and applies for com- 
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munity membership of the IMF. Such a 
communitarization of international mone-
tary policy would certainly require an 
amendment of the EU treaty. The Treaty of 
Lisbon does not provide for such a step ei-
ther. Furthermore, the introduction of EU 
membership would make it necessary to 
change the IMF statutes, and this hinges 
on whether or not the U.S. decides to make 
use of its veto. Since both an amendment 
of the EU treaty and a similar amendment 
of the IWF statutes are currently not on 
the cards, the distant goal of EU member-
ship cannot be among the suggestions 
which could be implemented at short no-
tice. The same arguments speak against 
the short-term goal of a community mem-
bership of the Eurozone in the IMF. 
 
•  An alternative to community member-
ship is the establishment of a European 
voting group within the IMF. Since voting 
groups in the IMF are based on the voli-
tion of their member states, no one could 
stop the Europeans from such a move. A 
European voting group could be estab-
lished on the basis of political will and as 
a simple bilateral agreement of the coun-
tries concerned. It would not be necessary 
to change the EU treaty, nor would it be 
imperative to change the IMF statutes. 
 
IV 
 
 
One Currency, One Voice: 
A Proposal 
In a political declaration the 15 member 
countries of the Eurozone should first of 
all articulate their intention of being rep-
resented in future within the IMF by a 
single euro rights group. Its consolidated 
voting rights would then be in the hands 
of a single representative on the Executive 
Board of the IMF. For two reasons this ap-
proach is preferable to a voting group 
comprising all 27 EU countries: 
 
•  On the one hand the interests of 27 EU 
countries with 14 different currencies are 
much more difficult to reconcile in a single 
voting group than the 15 euro countries 
with only one currency. 
 
•  On the other hand, the nature, task and 
role of the IMF as a monetary fund sug-
gests making the Eurogroup, which consti-
tutes a single currency area, the criterion 
for a European voting group within the 
IMF, and not Europe as a political union 
and integrational community. 
 
A euro voting group in the IMF would be 
based on the principle of “one currency, 
one vote.” Its voting rights would from the 
start turn it into a far more effective cham-
pion of the interests of the Eurogroup than 
is the case today.  
 
The voting rights of a Eurogroup of this 
kind should lie far beneath the total of the 
15 national voting rights which currently 
amount to about 23 per cent, though the 
Eurogroup would not necessarily be less 
influential as a result. On the contrary, 
even with a share of what would still be 
more than 15 per cent, the Eurogroup 
would in future have a veto similar to that 
of the U.S. At the same time the Eurozone 
would create considerable room for ma-
noeuvre for a global redistribution of capi-
tal quotas and voting rights in the IMF. If 
there were a suitable reform of the way in 
which quotas are calculated, it would be 
the emerging economies and third-world 
countries which would profit most. 
 
However, even if the establishment of a 
euro voting group meant that the national 
memberships in the IMF would continue 
for a while: As national representatives at 
the IMF, the ministers of finance benefit 
from the present situation. 
 
With a carefully considered proposal, 
which takes into account the interests of 
the emerging economies and third-world 
countries, the Europeans would be assum-
ing global responsibility. The economic in-
fluence of the new global currency would 
be channelled politically in the interests of 
a more equitable und thus a more legiti-
mate institutional governance of the global 
economy, and the Eurozone would have  
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come a long way towards becoming a po-
litically important actor in the field of in-
ternational finance and monetary policy. 
 
V 
A Franco-German 
Initiative? 
Within the euro voting group the initiative 
leading to the establishment of a European 
voting group would have to come from 
France and Germany, the only two euro 
countries which currently have their own 
seats on the Executive Board of the IMF. 
Such an initiative can hardly be expected 
to come from the finance ministries. As 
national representatives in the IMF they 
are the ones who profit from the current 
state of affairs. Questions of personal pres-
tige and the prospect of losing an impor-
tant international stage means that they 
are likely to back-pedal on this issue. It is 
thus up to the heads of state and govern-
ment. On this occasion, as in the case of 
monetary union, the initiative should come 
from them. 
“Questions of personal 
prestige hinder reform.” 
French president Nicolas Sarkozy came 
out in favour of a seat for Euroland in the 
IMF during the campaign for the French 
presidency. Angela Merkel, the German 
Chancellor, would simply have to remind 
him of his promise. The current chairman 
of the Eurogroup, Jean-Claude Juncker, is 
one of the political advocates of the con-
solidation of the Eurogroup in the IMF. He 
is supported by EU monetary commis-
sioner Joaquin Almunia and the current 
managing director of the IMF, Frenchman 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn. That should ac-
tually be enough for a “coalition of the 
able and the willing.” 
 
Junckers’ term as chairman of the Euro-
group finishes at the end of the year. The 
rules of the Eurogroup state that for the 
time being the prime and finance minister 
of Luxembourg, who has held this office 
since 2005, cannot be re-elected. Never-
theless there are persistent calls that 
Junckers should continue after the end of 
the year, partly because a candidate of a 
similar stature is not in the offing. Junck-
ers might well be persuaded to stay on, 
since his prospects of becoming the Presi-
dent of the EU Council have receded as a 
result of the Irish rejection of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. However, he should accede to 
these requests only if certain conditions 
are met, and one of these could relate to 
the representation of the Eurogroup in the 
IMF. Thus a “lex Juncker” pertaining to his 
re-election to the chair of the Eurogroup 
could combine what is desirable in terms 
of human resources with what is politi-
cally apposite. 
 
However, if ideas of national prestige and 
bureaucratic egoism continue to paralyze 
the power of the political leadership, it 
would once again be necessary to turn to 
the parliamentarians. For example, the na-
tional governments could be requested by 
an all-party private members’ bill, both in 
the European Parliament and in the na-
tional parliaments, to consolidate their 
representatives in the IMF in favour of a 
e u r o  v o t i n g  g r o u p .  T h i s  w o u l d  a l s o  s e n d  
out a positive signal in the run-up to the 
European election year in 2009.  
 
But when all is said and done, the euro has 
not yet reached the age of majority. It has 
only just become a “teenager” who may be 
rather precocious in economic terms, but 
politically (until further notice) continues 
to be a dwarf. However, quite a lot (see 
above) can be done to change this state of 
affairs. 
 
The author is Director of the Program   
Europe’s Future at the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung. 
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